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Extraordinary Relief of Punitive and
Administrative Discharges from the
Armed Forces
Peter F. Vaira*
A problem frequently encountered today in general law practice
involves an individual who, after having been released from one of the
armed services with a discharge in some degree less than the normal
honorable discharge, seeks the aid of a lawyer in changing the dis-
charge. The effects of an unfavorable discharge are beyond the scope
of this article. It is sufficient to note, however, that a discharge in any
degree less than honorable carries a mark of social stigma and, more
seriously, often acts as a bar to employment and educational oppor-
tunities.'
The purpose of this article is to discuss both the judicial and
administrative remedies available for seeking relief of a less than honor-
able discharge. The discussion will cover both punitive discharges
(those awarded by courts-martial) 2 and administrative discharges (those
awarded by administrative boards),3 and its scope will be limited to
* A.B., Duquesne University, 1959; J.D., Duquesne University, 1962. Former Appel-
late Defense Counsel, Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Navy. Attorney, Criminal
Division, U.S. Department of Justice.
1. See Sofranoff v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 470 (1964); Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d
852, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Dougherty and Lynch, The Administrative Discharge: Military
Justice, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 498 (1964); Brown, The Results of the Punitive Discharge,
1961 JAG J. 13; Note, 69 YALE L.J. 474, 490 (1960).
2. There are two types of punitive discharges; a dishonorable discharge and a bad
conduct discharge. 10 U.S.C. § 856; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1969, para. 127(c) Table
of Maximum Punishments, Section A. A bad conduct discharge can be awarded by either
a special or a general court-martial, but a dishonorable discharge can be awarded only
by a general court-martial. 10 U.S.C. § 818, 819; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1969, para.
127(c) Table of Maximum Punishments, Section A. Dishonorable or bad conduct dis-
charges are given to enlisted men only. Punitive removal of an officer can only be ac-
complished by a dismissal awarded "by sentence of a general court-martial," "in com-
mutation of a sentence of a general court-martial," or "in time of war by order of the
President." 10 U.S.C. § 1161. In all cases in which a punitive discharge or dismissal is
awarded (and approved by the convening authority) there is an automatic review by a
Court of Military Review. 10 U.S.C. § 866. Thereafter, if the case involves a flag or
general officer or the death penalty, it is automatically reviewed by the U.S. Court of
Military Appeals. 10 U.S.C. § 867. Otherwise, a case involving a punitive discharge or
a dismissal must be certified to the Court of Military Appeals by the Judge Advocate
General of the service involved, or be granted a review by the Court on petition by the
accused for "good cause shown." 10 U.S.C. § 867.
3. Administrative discharges are awarded pursuant to regulations prescribed by the
Department of Defense and the Secretaries of the services involved, on authority of the
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remedies available after the discharge has been finalized. No attempt
will be made to discuss the practice before military courts-martial or
military appellate courts where the serviceman is represented by mili-
tary lawyers.
The choice of remedy will depend upon the nature of the discharge,
the relief desired, and whether the serviceman is confined pursuant
to sentence of court-martial.
If the serviceman has been awarded a punitive discharge by a
court-martial, it is possible that the discharge proceeding itself may be
attacked by a petition to the Judge Advocate General of the service
involved. The initial determination must be made whether there exist
grounds sufficient to warrant the expectation that such relief will be
granted. Title 10 U.S.C. § 873 provides in part:
At any time within two years after approval by the convening
authority of a court-martial sentence the accused may petition the
judge Advocate General for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence or fraud on the court.4
following statutes: Officer separations, 10 U.S.C. § 3781 (Army), 10 U.S.C. § 5864 (Navy),
10 U.S.C. § 8791 (Air Force), and 14 U.S.C. § 321 (Coast Guard). Enlisted separations,
R.S. 161, 5 U.S.C. § 301, 10 U.S.C. §§ 3811-20, 6291-98, 8811-20. The Secretary of Defense
has issued a directive implementing these statutes. 32 C.F.R. 41.
The types of administrative discharges with which the lawyer will most likely be
concerned are the general discharge (separation under honorable conditions) 32 C.F.R.
41.3(m); and the undesirable discharge (separation under conditions other than honor-
able) 32 C.F.R. 41.3(n). A general discharge may be issued on the grounds of unsuitability
and is usually given for physical or medical reasons. 32 C.F.R. 41.6(g). An undesirable
discharge is usually awarded for unfitness for one of the following reasons:
1. Frequent involvement of a discreditable nature with civil or military authorities.
2. Sexual perversion, including, but not limited to (I) lewd and lascivious acts,
(II) homosexual acts, (III) sodomy, (IV) indecent exposure, (V) indecent acts with
or assault upon a child, (VI) other indecent acts or offenses.
3. Drug addiction, habitation, or the unauthorized use or possession of narcotics,
hypnotics, sedatives, tranquilizers, stimulants, hallucinogens, and other similar
known harmful or habit forming drugs and/or chemicals.
4. An established pattern for shirking.
5. An established pattern showing dishonorable failure to pay just debts.
6. An established pattern showing dishonorable failure to contribute adequate
support to dependents or failure to comply with orders, decrees, or judgments of
a civil court concerning support of dependents.
7. Unsanitary habits. 32 C.F.R. 41.6(i).
The services have issued procedural regulations implementing the foregoing directive.
See ARMY REGULATION No. 635-212 (July 14, 1966); AIR FORCE MANUAL No. 39-12 (Septem-
ber 1, 1966); BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL MANUAL C-10302 to C-10314, change 13.
A serviceman cannot be issued an undesirable discharge unless he has been afforded
certain procedural safeguards, such as a hearing before a board of officers and representa-
tion by counsel. 32 C.F.R. 41.7. These same procedural requirements apply to the
issuing of a general or honorable discharge for unsuitability where the serviceman has
eight or more years of active military service. 32 C.F.R. 41.7.
4. In the Coast Guard the petition is made to the General Counsel of the Depart-
ment of Transportation. 10 U.S.C. § 801.
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The Manual for Courts-Martial, 1969, provides that a new trial will
not be granted unless the petitioner can "affirmatively establish that
an injustice has resulted from the findings or the sentence and that a
new trial would probably produce a substantially more favorable re-
sult for the accused." 5 The evidence must have been discovered since
the trial and the accused must establish that he exercised due diligence
to discover it at the time of trial. He must also show that, if the
evidence were to be considered by the court-martial, it would pro-
duce a substantially more favorable result. If fraud upon the court
is offered as a reason for the new trial, it must be shown that the
fraud had a "substantial contributing effect" to the findings or sen-
tence.6
If, when the serviceman contacts the attorney, he is confined pursu-
ant to the sentence of a court-martial, the verdict and sentence may also
be attacked by means of an application for writ of habeas corpus to a
Federal District Court. The application must be made in the district
where the custodian of petitioner is located or, if the serviceman is
confined outside the United States, in the district where the person
having authority over that custodian (such as the Secretary of the
Navy) is located.7
Military post conviction remedies should be exhausted before filing
an application for a writ of habeas corpus, and failure to do so will
result in the court's declining to hear the merits of the appeal.8 As
hereafter indicated, the law in this area is unsettled. While the scope
of review in habeas corpus proceedings of a court-martial verdict by
a federal district court is limited, it has been expanding slowly over
the past twenty years.
Traditionally, a civil court's power to review a court-martial con-
viction by an application for a writ of habeas corpus was limited
to a determination of "whether the military court had jurisdiction of
5. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1969, para. 109(d).
6. Id. Examples of fraud which may warrant a new trial are perjury, willful con-
cealment by the prosecution of exculpatory evidence, and willful concealment of a
material ground for challenge by the military judge, a court member, or the convening
authority.
7. Compare Day v. Wilson, 247 F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1957) with Duncan v. Maine, 195
F. Supp. 199 (D.C. Maine 1961) and U.S. ex rel. Quinn v. Hunter, 162 F.2d 644 (7th Cir.
1947). See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), petition for rehearing denied, 346 U.S.
844 (1953).
8. Noyd v. Bond, - U.S. -, No. 830, O.T. 1968, June 16, 1969; Gusick v. Schilder,
340 U.S. 128 (1950); Branford v. United States, 356 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Parker, 390 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1968). When military jurisdiction is attacked
however, it appears that complete exhaustion of military remedies is unnecessary. Noyd
v. Bond, supra; See Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957);
Guagliardo v. McElroy, 259 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1958), abf'd, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
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the person and subject matter, and whether, though having juris-
diction, it had exceeded its powers in the sentence produced."9
Once the civil court made this determination, the review was com-
pleted. Correction of any other errors was left to military authorities
who were deemed "alone authorized to review . . . [the court-martial]
decision."' 0
A departure by the Supreme Court from this strict view occurred in
Burns v. Wilson." There petitioners, who had been convicted of mur-
der and sentenced to death by an Air Force Court-Martial, sought a
writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District Court by contending
their conviction had been obtained without due process of law. After
the District Court and Court of Appeals had denied issuance of the
writ, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Chief Justice Vinson,
in an opinion joined by Justices Reed, Burton, and Clark, upheld
the lower court's ruling, but in so doing departed from the traditional
scope of court-martial review. The court said:
The military courts, like the state courts, have the same responsi-
bilities as do the federal courts to protect a person from a viola-
tion of his constitutional rights. In military habeas corpus cases,
even more than in state habeas corpus cases, it would be in dis-
regard of the statutory scheme if the federal civil courts failed to
take account of the prior proceedings-of the fair determinations
of the military tribunals after all military remedies have been
exhausted. Congress has provided that these determinations are
"final" and "binding" upon all courts. We have held before that
this does not displace the civil courts' jurisdiction over an applica-
tion for habeas corpus from the military prisoner .... [But] when
a military decision has dealt fully and fairly with an allegation
raised in that application, it is not open to a federal civil court
to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the evidence.
[I]t is not the duty of the civil courts . . . to re-examine and
re-weigh each item of evidence of the occurence of events which
9. Carter v. Roberts, 177 U.S. 496, 498 (1900); accord, Swain v. United States, 165 U.S.
553 (1897); Collins v. McDonald, 258 U.S. 416 (1922); In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
10. Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950). This case is an example of how strictly the
rule was applied, notwithstanding the existence of patent error. The Supreme Court
dismissed the application even though the Court of Appeals found that the accused
was convicted on an inconsistent theory, on evidence not measuring up to malice,
premeditation, or deliberation for a murder conviction, that the law member appointed
was grossly incompetent, that there was no pre-trial investigation, that counsel for ac-
cused was incompetent and submitted only a token defense, and appellate review by the
army reviewing authorities revealed a total misconception of the applicable law. 175 F.2d
273, 277 (6th Cir. 1949).
11. 346 U.S. 137, rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 844.
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tend to prove or disprove one of the allegations in the applica-
tions for habeas corpus. It is the limited function of the civil
courts to determine whether the military have given fair consi-
deration to each of these claims. (Emphasis added.) 12
Justice Minton concurred only in the result, and expressed his feeling
that review should be limited to the traditional inquiry whether the
military court had technical jurisdiction."3
Justice Frankfurter neither concurred nor dissented, but said that
the inquiry concerning a military sentence by habeas corpus was
broader than the technical jurisdictional review, and that additional
argument should be heard before determining what the exact scope
should be.14 Upon denial of rehearing 15 Justice Frankfurter filed a
separate opinion in which he stated that lower courts should not be
left with the "inconclusive determination which our disposition of the
case . . . implies."' 6
The divergence of the "majority opinions" in Burns left the area
unclear for some time;17 recently, however, some lower federal courts
have definitely held that the traditional technical jurisdiction review is
dead.- ' They now examine, albeit cautiously, courts-martial proceed-
ings to determine whether the "military court dealt fully and fairly
with an allegation raised in the application."' 9
The courts have varied, however, in the extent to which they will
carry this examination. In Kennedy v. Commandant20 it was held that
'in military habeas corpus the civil courts have jurisdiction to de-
12. Id. at 142, 144.
13. Id. at 146.
14. Id. at 149.
15. 346 U.S. 844 (1953).
16. Justice Frankfurter wanted the case set down for further argument to consider
whether the doctrine of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) should apply. In Johnson
the court held that procedural errors in a criminal trial which did not amount to
strict questions of jurisdiction could be attacked by means of habeas corpus to detennine
if they amounted to a denial of constitutional right. If such a denial was found the
court was deemed to have lost jurisdiction, and the conviction was invalid. The Court
of Claims applied this doctrine to invalidate a military conviction in Shapiro v. United
States, 107 Ct. Cl. 650, 69 F. Supp. 205 (1947). Justice Frankfurter decried the fact that
neither side in Burns offered Shapiro for the court's consideration. 346 U.S. 847.
17. See Bishop, Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral Review of Court-
Martial Convictions, 61 CAL. L. REV. 40 (1961).
18. "Burns v. Wilson . . .if it accomplished nothing else, conclusively rejected the
concept advocated by Justice Minton that habeas corpus review should be limited to
the questions of formal jurisdiction." Gibbs v. Blackwell, 354 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir.
1965). Other federal courts have also held that the basic inquiry upon application for
writ of habeas corpus extends beyond the inquiry of technical jurisdiction. See Day v.
Wilson, 247 F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Rushing v. Wilkinson, 272 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 914 (1965); De Coster v. Madigen, 223 F.2d 906 (7th Cir. 1955).
19. Burns v. Wilson, supra, n. 10, at 142.
20. 377 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1967).
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termine whether the accused was denied any basic right guaranteed
to him by the constitution.' "21 The question in Kennedy concerned
the adequacy of petitioner's defense counsel before the special court-
martial that convicted him. The court noted that it could not make a
factual determination of whether the petitioner's counsel was inade-
quate because "where the constitutional issue involves a factual de-
termination ... [the] inquiry is limited to whether the military court
gave full and fair consideration to the constitutional issues pre-
sented. '22 It held that it was free, however, to determine the purely
legal point whether the sixth amendment required certified legal coun-
sel at special courts-martial. 23
Where it appears that the military courts have not litigated a con-
stitutional question, a trial de novo has been ordered in the District
Court. In both Gibbs v. Blackwel 24 (involving denial of effective
counsel), and Swisher v. United States25 (involving insanity at the
time of trial), the Court remanded to the district court with in-
structions to hold a full hearing on the questions not decided by the
military.
Naturally if the serviceman is not being confined, the writ of
habeas corpus remedy is unavailable. In Gallagher v. Quinn26 an ex-
serviceman, no longer in confinement, filed a complaint for a mandatory
injunction and general relief in Federal District Court to compel
the Court of Military Appeals to review his case. The District Court
dismissed the petition on the ground it could not review the case be-
cause the traditional habeas corpus avenue was closed. The Court of
Appeals recognized the requirement of constitutional due process in
military trials, noted that the right to due process would be lost if
one deprived of it could not obtain redress because he was not in
confinement, and said:
The Supreme Court is the final arbiter of due process under the
constitution. The Supreme Court has not been granted juris-
diction to review either on direct appeal or by certiorari a deci-
sion of the Court of Military Appeals. The consequence is that
21. Id. at 342.
22. Id.
23. Id. But see Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D.C. Utah 1965), where a
district court made a factual determination that the accused's counsel was so inadequate
in the performance of his duties that the accused was denied the effective assistance of
counsel.
24. 254 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1965).
25. 326 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1964).
26. 363 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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unless jurisdiction lies in the District Court in such a case as
this, with appellate jurisdiction in this court and then in the
Supreme Court, the constitutional validity of the Act of Con-
gress cannot be decided except by a military tribunal. The 'sepa-
rate and apart' military law jurisprudence, referred to in those
terms in Burns v. Wilson .. . would appear not to be separated so
far from possible Supreme Court scrutiny.27
The court then treated complainant's prayer for general relief as a
request for declaratory judgment and proceded to consider the con-
stitutional questions. Other courts have followed Gallagher and recog-
nized that a serviceman can seek review by a federal district court on a
constitutional question notwithstanding he is not confined. 28
In cases involving petitions for declaratory judgment, such as Galla-
gher, the scope of review is identical to that accorded an application
for a writ of habeas corpus.29 Thus, it appears that the federal courts
will examine claims that servicemen were denied constitutional rights
in trials by courts-martial, but will grant relief only in those cases
where there is a clear violation of rights. Until the rule in Burns is
clarified the district courts will be reluctant to significantly extend the
scope of the "full and fair consideration" test.30
In lieu of a Gallagher type action in Federal District Court, a peti-
tion to one of the two administrative boards, the Discharge Review
Board and the Board for Correction of Military Records, established
by Congress in each of the armed services should be considered. Relief
may be sought before these boards for errors not amounting to constitu-
tional violations.31
In each service the Discharge Review Board has the power, "subject
to the review by the Secretary concerned, to change a discharge or
dismissal, or issue a new discharge, to reflect its findings. ' 32 Review of a
dismissal or discharge by a general court-martial is, however, specifically
27. Id. at 304.
28. Kaufman v. Secretary of the Air Force, et al., 269 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C. 1967);
Robson v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 631 (E.D. Pa. 1968); but cf. Davies v. Clifford,
393 F.2d 496 (1st Cir. 1968).
29. Kaufman v. Secretary of the Air Force, supra.
30. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases decided by the Court of
Claims, Augenblict v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 357-64, 377 F.2d 586 (1967); Juhl v.
United States, Ct. Cl. No. 353-65, 383 F.2d 1009 (1967), on the issue of the scope of
review of courts-martial verdicts by civilian courts; however, the Supreme Court ruled
without reaching the question. 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
31. Decisions of the Discharge Review Boards and the Boards for Correction of
Military Records are unpublished. The above stated information is based upon the
author's observations while serving as appellate defense counsel in the Office of the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy, Washington, D.C.
32. 10 U.S.C. 1553(b).
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exempted from this board.a3 The board may review any administrative
discharge, and any bad conduct discharge awarded by a special court-
martial, and may substitute a discharge of higher quality. It will auto-
matically grant any applicant a hearing, with counsel provided by the
serviceman, but it lacks subpoena power and cannot award back pay.3 4
If relief is denied here the serviceman may petition the Board
for the Correction of Military Records of the particular service
branch involved. Pursuant to Title 10 U.S.C. § 1552:
The Secretary of a military department, under procedures estab-
lished by him and approved by the Secretary of Defense, and
acting through boards of civilians of the executive part of that
military department, may correct any military record of that de-
partment when he considers it necessary to correct an error or
remove an injustice.
This request must be filed within three years of discovery of the error
or injustice. A board, however, "may excuse a failure to file within
three years after discovery if it finds it to be in the interest of jus-
tice."36
The Correction Board has broader powers than the Discharge Re-
view Board-extending to changing the nature of a discharge, re-
instating a serviceman to active duty, and awarding back pay, among
others.36 Unlike the Discharge Review Board, a hearing is not granted
in all cases when requested, and the Board for Correction of Military
Records may render a decision based only upon the petitioner's writ-
ten application and his service record.3 7
Military correction boards cannot disturb the finality of court-
martial judgments.38 Despite this fact, however, the Judge Advocates-
General of the various services have held that where an injustice is
found in the proceedings the correction board may, as a matter
of clemency, effect a change in the sentence as entered in the service-
man's records. The Judge Advocate-General of the Army stated the
position in this fashion:
In consonance with . . . [the] opinions of the Attorney General,
this office has expressed the opinion that the Army Board for the
33. 10 U.S.c. 1553(a).
34. See Everett, Military Administrative Discharges-The Pendulum Swings, 1966
DuKE LAW JOURNAL, 41, 60.
35. 10 U.S.C. 1552(b).
36. See Everett, supra n.34, at 63.
37. E.g. 32 C.F.R. 723 3(e).
38. 40 Ops. ATry. GEN. 504.
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Correction of Military Records, or the comparable boards in the
other military departments, not being established as appellate
tribunals in the court-martial system, may not determine that
the proceedings, findings, or sentence of a court-martial are
erroneous, nor recommend that they be declared null and void.
If, however, the Board determines that an injustice has been
effected by the imposition of a particular sentence, the Board
may legally recommend that military records, other than the
records pertaining directly to the court-martial trial and appellate
proceedings, be corrected to effect a change in the results of a
sentence, as distinguished from the sentence itself. This is not
considered a reopening of or a collateral attack upon the judg-
ment of the court-martial, but rather is considered in the nature
of an act of clemency, comparable to a successful appeal to the
Congress for relief by private legislation.
39
Thus, the correction board changes the results of a court-martial
sentence rather than the sentence itself. For example, the board may
correct the record to show that an administrative discharge (honor-
able or less than honorable) was issued rather than a punitive dis-
charge, or that all or part of the confinement or forfeitures of pay
had been remitted, or that the serviceman was not reduced in grade.40
If a petitioner is merely seeking a change in his discharge he must
first exhaust his remedies before the discharge review board.4 1 Select-
ing which of these two boards to petition involves some choice of
tactics. One writer in the field has described it in the following
manner:
In a discharge case you may decide to apply first to the Discharge
Review Board and then later to the Correction Board; in this
way you are getting two chances to present your client's case.
However, I would suspect that if a hearing already has taken
place before a Discharge Review Board, a Correction Board
would be less likely to grant a hearing than if no prior hearing
had occurred. Thus, you may choose to work your client's applica-
tion for relief in such a way-by requesting back pay or other
monetary relief-that it will fall outside the jurisdiction of a
Discharge Board. Then it will be possible to go directly to the
39. OP JAGA 1956/5599, July 9, 1956. Accord, OP JAGN 1954/231, August 5, 1954,
4 Dig. Op. Records 16.7; OP JAGAF 1952/5, 1 Dig. Op. Records 16.7.
40. Op. JAGA 1956/2452, March 2, 1956; see Willians, The Army Board for Correction
of Military Records, 6 MIL. L. REvIEw 41 (1959).
41. E.g. 32 C.F.R. 723 3(c); Redd, "The Board for the Correction of Naval Records,"
19 JAG JOURNAL 9, 10 (1964).
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Correction Board without pausing for proceedings before the
Discharge Review Board.42
It should be noted that the statute provides that the Secretary of
the service involved, acting through the board, may correct any mili-
tary record. Thus, the Secretary may legally act contrary to the find-
ings and conclusions of the board. For example, Navy regulations pro-
vide "the record of proceedings of the board will be forwarded to
the Secretary of the Navy who will lirect such action in each case
as he determines to be appropriate .... -43However, decisions of the
Secretary are subject to judicial review to determine whether he has
acted within his authority. 44 Thus, the Secretary may not arbitrarily
overrule a correction board where the board's findings are justified by
the record. 45 The courts have reversed the decision of the Secretary
where: he refused to follow the recommendation of the board to
credit an officer's unused leave to his term of enlistment;46 where he
refused to accept the board's recommendation that a serviceman's rec-
ord be corrected to indicate he retired from a physical disability;
47
and where the Secretary considered matters outside the serviceman's
military record, contrary to Army Regulations, to award the service-
man a less than Honorable Discharge.48
In 1965 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in de-
ciding Ashe v. McNamara,49 expanded the scope of judicial review
of the decisions of the Administrative Boards. Ashe had been dishon-
orably discharged from the Navy in 1948 by a general court-martial.
The Board for the Correction of Naval Records had denied his ap-
plication to change his discharge to one under honorable conditions,
and the Secretary of the Navy had approved the board's decision. Ashe
then petitioned the Federal District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts to compel the Secretary of Defense to take favorable action
on his petition. Ashe alleged lack of effective assistance of counsel
as a violation of the sixth amendment of the Constitution. because
his counsel had been forced to represent both Ashe and another de-
42. Everett, supra n.34, at 65.
43. 32 C.F.R. 723.7; see Redd, supra n.41, at 25.
44. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958); Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 853 (D.C.
Cir. 1961).
45. Nelson v. Miller, 373 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1967) and cases cited therein at fn. 15.
46. Eicks v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 445, 145 Ct. Cl. 552 (1959).
47. Proper v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 317, 139 Ct. Cl. 511 (1957).
48. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
49. 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965).
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fendant who had a conflicting defense. The district court granted
summary judgment for the Secretary. On appeal the court of appeals
held that Ashe was in fact denied effective assistance of counsel, and
found that his trial was so unfair that if Ashe had applied for a writ
of habeas corpus while incarcerated a district court would have been
obliged to grant the writ.5" The court also held that the finality
provision in the statute creating the Correction Board 5' did not pre-
clude judicial review of any board action changing or declining to
change the nature of a discharge.
It should be noted that the Court granted the relief on what
amounted to a constitutional error. It is doubtful whether a court
would issue a mandamus in an Ashe situation where the error was
procedural or evidentiary, and did not amount to a denial of a con-
stitutional right.52
One additional remedy deserves mention which might, in some
limited circumstances, prove useful in obtaining relief for the service-
man. In United States v. Frischoltz,53 United States v. Callahan,54 and
United States v. Bevilacqua and Braun,5 5 the Court of Military Ap-
peals held that it possessed the power under the All Writs Act58 to
entertain the common law writ of Error Coram Nobis. Coram Nobis
is an extraordinary writ used to collaterally attack a judgment when
no other remedy is available.57 The court pointed out that the writ
has had a limited application:
Coram Nobis is not a substitute for an appeal. It is extraordinary
relief predicated upon 'exceptional circumstances' not apparent to
the court in its original consideration of the case .... It may not
be used to seek a reevaluation of the evidence or a reconsidera-
tion of alleged errors.58
To justify the issuance of the writ, the errors alleged must affect
the "validity and regularity of the judgment."5 9 Relief will be granted
50. Id. at 280.
51. ". . . a correction under this section is final and conclusive on all officers of the
United States." 10 U.S.C. § 1552.
52. See Smith v. McNamara, 395 F.2d 896, 900 (10th Cir. 1968).
53. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 150, 36 C.M.R. 306 (1966).
54. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 568, 37 C.M.R. 188 (1967).
55. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 10, 39 C.M.R. 10 (1968).
56. 28 U.S.C. 165 (1964). The Supreme Court expressly approved the Fritscholtz
decision on this point in Noyd v. Bond, supra, n. 1.
57. See Freedman, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis, 3 TEMP. L.Q. 365 (1929); 18
AM. JUR. 2d 445; 5 Orfield, Criminal Procedure Under the Federal Rules, sec. 33:101
et seq.
58. United States v. Frischoltz, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 150, 153, 36 C.M.R. 306 (1966).
59. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 507 (1954). H. STEPHENS, PRUNCIPLES OF
PLEADING 143 (3d Amer. ed. 1901).
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under this remedy ". . . only under circumstances compelling such
action to achieve justite."60
Coram Nobis might be a proper vehicle to bring before the Court
of Military Appeals newly discovered evidence or information regard-
ing fraud upon the court which cannot be used as a basis for seek-
ing a new trial because two years have elapsed since the court-martial.6'
If the petition to the administrative boards proves unsuccessful, a
suit in the Court of Claims should be considered. This court is di-
vorced from the military establishment and has heard many cases
dealing with the imposition of discharges. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1491
provides in part:
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment
upon any claim against the United States:
(1) Founded upon the Constitution; or
(2) Founded upon any Act of Congress; or
(3) Founded upon any regulation of an executive department.
Under this provision a serviceman can claim back pay, alleging
that his discharge was awarded either in violation of his constitu-
tional rights or in violation of federal regulations, and thus have the
discharge adjudicated in the Court of Claims. The theory of the suit
is that the plaintiff sues for pay he contends he is entitled to because
his discharge was a nullity.62 The court must then, in determining
whether he is entitled to back pay,63 decide the validity of the dis-
charge. If it decides the serviceman was invalidly discharged from the
armed service he regains his status as a serviceman until a valid dis-
charge takes place, or until the date his term of enlistment would
have expired. The award made includes a right to pay and allow-
ances for the period, less appropriate setoffs.64
When considering suits involving punitive discharges, the Court of
Claims has consistently held that a "denial of significant constitu-
tional rights . . . render[s] the military conviction invalid, and . . .
permit[s] . .. [the] court to award back pay." 65
60. United States v. Morgan, supra n. 59 at 511.
61. See 10 U.S.C. 873.
62. See Meador, Judicial Determinations of Military Status, 72 YALE L.J. 1293, 1300
(1963).
63. Like all federal courts, the Court of Claims has the power to decide all issues
which are necessary to the case before it. Osbom v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738
(1824).
64. Shaw v. United States, 174 Ct. Cl. 899, 920; 357 F.2d 949 (1966).
65. Shaw v. United States, supra note 64, cases cited therein at fn. 4.
A suggested area for attack is the bad conduct discharge awarded pursuant to MANUAL
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Although the Court of Claims has stated that it will apply the "full
and fair hearing" test of Burns,66 it has also held that it is free to
draw its own conclusions from facts already found by the military
courts.67 Thus, in Shaw v. United States, the Court of Claims held
that, on the basis of the Navy's own findings, the serviceman could
not "constitutionally" be held to have embezzled funds entrusted to
his care. 68 And, in Shapiro v. United States,69 plaintiff was awarded
back pay where the court found that his constitutional right of due
process and his right to counsel were clearly violated. The court held
that while the court-martial had had jurisdiction at the beginning
of the trial, because of the denial of the accused's constitutional
rights jurisdiction was lost, and the verdict rendered by it was void.
The court-martial error advanced as the basis for the back pay
claim must involve a deprivation of a constitutional right; other-
wise the Court of Claims is powerless to make any award. In two
1967 cases, the Court of Claims awarded back pay to servicemen,
only to have the judgments reversed by the Supreme Court on the
grounds that no deprivation of a constitutional right was shown.
In Augenblick v. United States0 the Court of Claims determined
that rulings by the law officer at the court-martial and certain portions
of the decision of the Board of Review violated the Jencks Act re-
garding the production of government documents. The court rea-
soned that the denial amounted (in the particular circumstances of
the case) to a denial of due process. In Juhl v. United States,71 the
court found plaintiff's conviction, based upon the introduction of
self-contradictory accomplice testimony, in violation of the evidentiary
provisions of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 1951. The court held
that the accomplice testimony rule in the manual was not a mere
rule of evidence, but rather a direction by the President, which, if
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1969, para. 127(c) Table of Maximum Punishments, Section B.
This provision authorizes a special or general court-martial to impose a bad conduct
discharge if the serviceman has a record of two or more prior convictions by courts-
martial, notwithstanding that the offense for which he is being tried does not authorize
a discharge. Quite often one or both of these prior convictions resulted from a summary
court-martial, a one-man court where the accused is not provided counsel. 10 U.S.C. § 816.
Thus, the discharge may be attacked on the grounds that it was awarded because of
prior convictions which resulted from proceedings in which the accused was not
represented by counsel.
66. Begalke v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 401, 286 F.2d 606 (1960).
67. Shaw v. United States, supra note 65.
68. Id. at 905.
69. 107 Ct. Cl. 650, 69 F. Supp. 205 (1947).
70. Ct. Cl. No. 357-64, 377 F.2d 586 (1967).
71. Ct. Cl. No. 353-65, 383 F.2d 1009 (1967).
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violated, went to the basic fairness of the conviction. A violation of
this rule, the court reasoned, amounted to a violation of a fundamental
right of due process. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments in
both cases on the grounds that the Court of Claims had "elevated to
a constitutional level" errors which were not deprivations of consti-
tutional rights.
7 2
A suit for back pay may also be filed in Federal District Court in
lieu of the Court of Claims.73 Monetary recovery here, however, is
limited to $10,000. It seems that this forum is used less than the
Court of Claims for back pay suits, even though the suit may be con-
veniently filed in the district where the plaintiff resides. 74 One pos-
sible reason for this preference is that the Court of Claims has been
a proven ground for successful suits of this type. Another reason may
be that attorneys engaged in practice in this area feel that local judges
may be very unfamiliar with military discharge problems.7 5
If the serviceman receives a money judgment in the Court of Claims,
the discharge is unaffected, and he must take further action to have
it declared invalid. Two alternatives are available. He may petition
the Board for the Correction of Military Records to correct his rec-
ord on the basis of the Court of Claims judgment to reflect an hon-
orable or general discharge, or he may sue for relief in Federal Dis-
trict Court. In the latter case the government would most likely be
estopped from asserting the validity of the discharge.7 6
If the serviceman has been awarded an administrative 77 discharge,
many of the same remedies for seeking relief of punitive discharges
are available. The first step should be a petition to the applicable
administrative board (depending upon the relief desired) discussed
earlier. The foregoing discussion of the administrative boards and the
judicial relief thereof regarding punitive discharges applies to admin-
istrative discharges as well. Care should be taken to examine the pro-
cedural regulations pursuant to which the serviceman was discharged.
72. United States v. Augenblict, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). See generally H.R. REP. No. 1604, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 2
(1967).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).
75. Joint Hearings before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIcHTS of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary and a SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ARMED FORCES, on Bills to Improve the Administration of Justice in the Armed Services,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., Appendix A, 832 (1966).
76. See Everett, Military Administrative Discharges-The Pendulum Swings, 1966
DUKE L.J. 41, 68.
77. See supra n.3.
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Quite often the prescribed procedure is not followed and the dis-
charge may be declared void on this ground.78
If no relief is obtained from the administrative boards, a back
pay suit in the Court of Claims should be considered.79 Where the
claim for back pay is based upon an administrative rather than a
punitive discharge, the Court of Claims has a broader scope of re-
view.80 It is also free to determine whether the military service fol-
lowed its own regulations in processing the discharge.8' Administra-
tive discharges have been declared invalid for failure to give notice
as required by service regulations, 2 for failure to inform servicemen
of a material fact relating to procedure which might have influenced
him to contest the undesirable discharge,83 and for using an admin-
istrative discharge as punishment.8 4 The Court of Claims will also
award a claim for back pay where it determines the administrative
discharge proceedings were violative of fundamental notions of due
process of law.85
SUMMARY
The following steps are suggested for an attorney who is repre-
senting an individual who is seeking to change his less than honorable
discharge.
Punitive Discharges
If a man is still confined, determine if there exist grounds upon
which a petition for new trial can be based. If there are none, con-
sider filing an application for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal Dis-
trict Court. The law regarding the scope of review of courts-martial
verdicts in District Court is still somewhat unclear, but an error
amounting to a denial of a constitutional right is necessary for relief.
If the serviceman is not confined, a suit for declaratory judgment in
Federal District Court or a petition to one of the administrative
boards in the service involved should be the next step. It should be
remembered, however, that in the suit for declaratory judgment the
78. See Everett, supra note 66 at 75.
79. An alternative suit is possible in Federal District Court. See notes 73, 74 supra.
80. Harmel, Military Pay Cases before the Court of Claims, 55 GEo. L.J. 529, 531
(1966).
81. See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
82. Cole v. United States, 171 Ct. CL. 178 (1965).
83. Middleton v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 36 (1965).
84. Sofranoff v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 470 (1964).
85. Clackum v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 404, 296 F.2d 226 (1960).
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courts apply the same scope of review of courts-martial verdicts as
in habeas corpus cases. The administrative boards will grant relief
for errors not amounting to a denial of a constitutional right.
If relief is denied by the administrative boards, the next step is
the Court of Claims, where the validity of the discharge is determined
in the serviceman's suit for back pay. An award here will not affect
the discharge, and further court or administrative action will be
necessary to change the nature of the discharge. A final but limited
remedy is a petition for writ of Coram Nobis to the Court of Military
Appeals. Although this is an extraordinary writ, it may prove suc-
cessful in some limited circumstances.
Administrative Discharges
The first step is to petition the appropriate administrative board in
the service involved. If relief is denied here, the next step should be
the Court of Claims. Care should be taken to examine the service
regulations pursuant to which the serviceman was discharged. Quite
often the regulations are not followed and the serviceman is denied
certain rights during the administrative procedure which will void
the discharge.
The subject of serviceman's rights is under continual study by Con-
gress and the armed services. The area is subject to constant change
and the attorney handling such a case should be aware that new legis-
lation and revised service regulations may afford his client additional
remedies that did not exist at the time of the imposition of the dis-
charge.
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